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IN THE “BEST INTERESTS” OF THE DISABLED:
LEGISLATING MORALITY AND THE POWER TO
INITIATE SUPPORT ORDERS FOR DISABLED
ADULTS IN OHIO
KALYNNE PROCTOR*
ABSTRACT
Today’s reality is that many families have children who are faced with disabling
conditions that prevent them from relinquishing their dependency on others. Often,
the need for specialized treatment and care does not terminate once a severely
disabled child reaches adulthood. While typically parents are relieved of their legal
parental obligations to their adult-aged children, this is not the same case for parents
with severely disabled children. In some respects, Ohio has recognized the financial
difficulties divorced parents face when they are the sole caregivers of disabled, adult
children. Although Ohio law requires that the noncustodial parent in a divorce pay
child support for their disabled adult children if the disability arose prior to the child
reaching eighteen, ambiguity in the law gives Ohio courts discretion to circumvent
their jurisdiction in these particular situations. Currently, Ohio courts differ in how
they interpret whether they retain jurisdiction to initiate support orders for disabled
children after the disabled child has reached the age of majority. This discretion is
problematic, and this type of arbitrary power punishes disabled adults for something
beyond their control—namely, the timing of their caregivers’ divorce. This Note
attempts to resolve the current ambiguity in Ohio law by arguing that Ohio law
should be interpreted to reflect the inevitable overlap between a parent’s moral and
legal duties and recognize the courts’ powers to initiate support orders for disabled
adults.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The familiar saying that “it takes a village to raise a child” is currently a reality
for most parents. This phrase is based on the premise that it takes more than one
caregiver to successfully provide for all the needs and direction required to raise a
child.1 Through historical transformations and leading moral views, family has
ultimately been designated as the origin of such support. Many parents would tend to
agree that family is often the best resource to shape children into productive
members of society capable of self-support through nurturing and financial care. Of
course, however, this conclusion is based on the presumption that all children will
eventually “graduate” from their dependency on caregivers and become adults who
are capable of providing for themselves, both physically and economically.
But in reality, many families have children who will never be able to support
themselves in their adult life. 2 Many children, because of circumstances beyond their
control, are faced with disabling conditions that prevent them from relinquishing
their dependency on others.3 More often than not, the need for specialized care does
1 See Joseph G. Healey, African Proverb of the Month: It Takes a Whole Village to Raise
a Child, AFRIPROV.ORG (Nov. 1998), http://www.afriprov.org/african-proverb-of-themonth/23-1998proverbs/137-november-1998-proverb.html.
2

In 2010, there were roughly 38.3 million people in the United States suffering from a
severe disabling condition. MATTHEW W. BRAULT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES: 2010 4 (2012).
3 This Note focuses on the population that have “severely disabling conditions.” Severe
disability, for purposes of this Note, is defined as an individual with a disability who has a
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not terminate once a severely disabled child reaches adulthood, resulting in their
continual reliance on family support.4 There are larger legal implications when a
child reaches adult status; while typically parents are relieved of parental obligations
to their adult aged children, this is not the case for parents with severely disabled
children.5 As a result, divorce court dockets now contain child support cases
involving custodial parents with unique burdens due to difficulties related to lifelong
care for their disabled adult children.6
Ohio has recognized the financial difficulties divorced parents face when they are
the sole caregivers of disabled, adult children.7 Ohio law generally requires the
noncustodial parent in the divorce to pay child support for their disabled adult
children if the onset of the disability arose prior to the child reaching the age of
eighteen.8 However, due to ambiguity in the law, Ohio courts retain discretion to
circumvent their jurisdiction within these particular situations. Currently, Ohio
courts differ in how they interpret whether they retain jurisdiction to initiate support
orders for disabled children after the disabled child has reached the age of majority. 9
This discretion is problematic. It gives Ohio courts the power to circumvent their
jurisdiction over a case involving the support of disabled adults solely because the
parents’ marriage ended in divorce after the disabled child reached adulthood.10 This
type of arbitrary power punishes disabled adults for something beyond their
control—namely, the timing of their caregivers’ divorce. As a result, custodial
parents are often left with the financial responsibility of supporting their disabled
adult child while the noncustodial parent escapes with a “get out of jail free” card.
severe physical or mental impairment which seriously limits one or more functional capacities
(such as mobility, communication, self-care, self-direction, interpersonal skills, work
tolerance, or work skills) in terms of employment outcome, whose rehabilitation can be
expected to require multiple rehabilitation services over an extended period of time. Individual
with a Severe Disability, LECTRIC LAW LIBRARY, http://www.lectlaw.com/def/i033.htm (last
visited Feb. 5, 2017).
4 See Jeffrey W. Childers, Hendricks v. Sanks: One Small Step for the Continued
Parental Support of Disabled Children Beyond the Age of Majority in North Carolina, 80
N.C. L. REV. 2094, 2094-95 (2002).
5

Id.

6

Laura W. Morgan, Termination of Child Support- Exception for Adult Children with
Disabilities,
NCSL.ORG
(May
6,
2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/humanservices/termination-of-child-support-exception-for-adult.aspx.
7

Id.

8

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3119.86 (West 2016) (“The duty of support to a child imposed
pursuant to a child support order shall continue beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday . . . [if]
[t]he child is mentally or physically disabled and is incapable of supporting or maintaining
himself or herself.”).
9 See Donohoo v. Donohoo, 2012-Ohio-4105 (12th Dist.); In re Edgel, 2010-Ohio-6435
(11th Dist.); Wiczynski v. Wiczynski, 2006-Ohio-867 (6th Dist.); Abbas v. Abbas, 715
N.E.2d 613 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998); cf. Geygan v. Geygan, 973 N.E.2d 276 (Ohio Ct. App.
1965) (demonstrating that a court does not have jurisdiction to initiate support order when
child has already reached the age of majority).
10 See Donohoo, 2012-Ohio-4105 ¶¶ 17-19 (discussing Castle v. Castle, 473 N.E. 2d 803
(1984)).
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This unfortunate circumstance became a reality for a divorced, single mother in
the 2012 Ohio case, Geygan v. Geygan.11 In Geygan, the marriage between parents
of two children began to deteriorate after thirty-eight years, ultimately resulting in
divorce.12 One of their children, over the age of eighteen at the time of divorce, had
severe physical and developmental disabilities since birth and was unable to
accomplish self-support.13 Prior to the divorce, both parents shared the burdensome
responsibility of supporting their disabled child financially. 14 However, the divorce
proceedings deemed the mother the custodial parent, responsible for the daily care
and support of her disabled adult child.15 Due to the need for continued care, coupled
with the economic hardships involved in raising a disabled adult, the mother sought
court assistance to obtain financial support from her ex-husband.16
Upon review by the Tenth District Court of Appeals, the court refused to help the
mother obtain the financial assistance she desperately sought and denied her request
accordingly. Instead, the court decided that it lacked jurisdiction to initiate a support
order for a disabled adult, despite the fact that it retained power to continue child
support for an adult child when such authority was first exercised before the child’s
eighteenth birthday.17 In other words, the court held that a support order must already
be in place prior to the disabled child reaching the age of majority in order to receive
support from a non-custodial parent in the child’s adult life.18 According to Geygan,
timing is essential in determining the outcome of these cases.19
However, the court fails to acknowledge the underlying morality behind the legal
obligation to support disabled adults. How can parents predict the timing of their
divorce? What about the morality concerns for disabled adult children that triggered
legal intervention in the first place? According to some Ohio courts, these inquiries
are irrelevant.20
Most people would generally agree that moral, noncustodial parents in a divorce
should bear the duty of supporting their disabled adult child. Although some scholars
attribute the legal duty of support to legislative efforts to eliminate resource
dependency, this Note contends that evolving moral views towards the traditionally
oppressed ultimately trigger legislative action. Accordingly, this Note argues that
Section 3119.86 of the Ohio Revised Code21 should be interpreted to reflect the
overlap between a parent’s moral and legal duties and recognize the courts’ power to
initiate support orders for disabled adults.
11

Geygan, 2012-Ohio-1965.

12

Id. at 277.

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

Id.

16

Id.

17

Id. at 279.

18

Id. at 280-81.

19

Id.

20

Id. at 279.

21

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3119.86 (West 2016).
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Section II of this Note provides background insight into the inevitable overlap
between law and morality in American society. In doing so, this Note illustrates
specific areas of law that supplement moral duties with legislation, focusing mainly
on judicial and legislative dependence on morality in family law and support
obligations. Section III of this Note begins to analyze why it is necessary to legislate
morality in order to establish the authority for courts to initiate support orders for the
disabled. To that end, this Note discusses how the moral duty to support disabled
children throughout adulthood triggered legislative action in the first place. In light
of the foregoing, this Note argues that courts should follow precedent and rely on
morality concerns to establish jurisdiction and justify their power to initiate support
under Section 3119.86 of the Ohio Revised Code. Because of the current ambiguity
in Ohio law, this Note ultimately proposes that Section 3119.86 should be amended
to expressly provide for the mandated support of severely disabled children beyond
the age of majority, regardless of whether the support order is initiated in domestic
relations courts prior to or after the disabled child reaches the age of majority.
In further support of this proposal, Section III-B of this Note presents a
compelling approach to the idea of legislating morality and notes that optimized
results will occur if the Ohio legislature supplements moral obligations with
legislation and expressly grant courts the authority to initiate support orders for
disabled adults. This Note supplements these arguments by analyzing the various
stances of the Ohio district courts of appeals on this particular issue, favoring those
decisions that overlap with moral principles. Finally, this Note examines how other
states approach the issue of support orders for adult disabled dependents.
II. BACKGROUND
A. “Legislating Morality”: Review of Judicial and Legislative Dependence on
Morality in American Law
Society cannot thrive in an orderly fashion without morality. While some
commentators may argue against legislating morality into codified law, 22 it cannot be
denied that in many areas of our legal system the two concepts are virtually
inseparable.23 Despite unrealistic views that legislating morality is deficient, the
reality is that the majority of successful regulations today legislate by directly
mimicking underlying moral principles.24 The concept of morality itself involves a
particular system of values and principles that create a doctrine of appropriate
conduct held by society.25 It is, therefore, cognizable that our laws often stem from a
system of such values and beliefs in determining what behaviors to regulate. 26
Because law and morality both aim to control the undesirable conduct of individuals,
22 See Sarah Braasch, Morality Has No Place in the Law, PATHEOS: DAYLIGHT ATHEISM
(Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.patheos.com/blogs/daylightatheism/2011/01/morality-has-noplace-in-the-law/.
23

Michael Bauman, Law and Morality, CHRISTIAN RES. INST. (Apr. 17, 2009),
http://www.equip.org/article/law-and-morality/.
24

Id.

25

Morality,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY,
webster.com/dictionary/morality (last visited Jan. 27, 2017)
26

http://www.merriam-

Bauman, supra note 23.
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in certain circumstances, it is necessary for morality to serve as the foundation for
legal or political systems.27
A prime example of morality placed at the core of legal and political
jurisprudence comes from the U.S. Constitution. 28 When drafting the Constitution,
the Founding Fathers exemplified the importance of aggregating moral norms with
law.29 In light of the oppressive, monarchical atmosphere surrounding its creation,
the Founding Fathers wrote the Constitution recognizing that political figures’
actions could deviate from morality and eventually become unjust. 30 Moreover,
because the Constitution was based on concepts of liberty and justice, morality
inevitably played a crucial role in the formulation of the “Law of the Land.” 31
Therefore, at the time of its creation, the Constitution symbolized a roadmap for
creating a nation grounded in morality and order through the establishment of
binding assertions on how a model society should operate.32
Morality continues to have the power of influence over laws today because it
provides the rationale behind making immoral actions unlawful.33 It is now widely
accepted that morality serves as the public expression behind laws “which [codify]
in a public way the basic principles of conduct which a society accepts.”34 It is
virtually inevitable that every legislative enactment speaks to moral values and
judgments, helping society differentiate right from wrong, innocence from guilt, and
justice from injustice.35 As scholar Jane C. Murphy suggests, “Each time the
Government, through its lawmakers, decides to regulate or refrains from regulating,
a choice in values is made.”36
Although there are several technical distinctions between American law and
morality, it is evident that—in certain areas of law—the overlap between the two is
necessary to successfully regulate societal conduct and promote fairness and
justice.37 While morality alone may not shape the behavior of those too stubborn to
conform, laws grounded in morality counter this issue, not only by distinguishing
right from wrong, but also by penalizing those individuals who refuse to learn from
27

Braasch, supra note 22.

28

See U.S. CONST.

29

Bauman, supra note 23.

30 See id. (discussing how the “founding fathers understood the actions of King George
were morally evil and politically unjust”).
31

Id.

32

Id.

33

See Ira H. Peak, Jr., Dworkin and Hart on the Law: A Polanyian Reconsideration, 18
TRADITION & DISCOVERY: THE POLANYI SOCIETY PERIODICAL 22, 25 (1991-92) (discussing
how legal rules have a connection to morals in both origin and interpretation).
34 See Jan Edward Garrett, Basic Observations on Law and Morality (Sept. 10, 2001),
http://people.wku.edu/jan.garrett/320/320lawmo.htm.
35

Id.

36

Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The New
Language of Morality in Family Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1111, 1133 (1999).
37 See Leslie Green, Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1035, 1036 (2008).
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the repercussions of their harmful actions. 38 This makes it clear that law is
sometimes needed to replace moral obligations in order to enhance a uniform and
orderly nation.39 Therefore, laws are maximized when the legal system places a duty
on its citizens in the interests of the public by legally imposing legitimate moral
obligations.40
1. Brief Overview of Areas of Law that Regulate Morality
a. Legislating Morality in Criminal Law
Some scholars of philosophy suggest, “It is a proper function of the criminal law
to promote good character, and to restrain or discourage people from engaging in
activities that cause moral harm to themselves or others.” 41 With that being said, it is
generally accepted that morality and law regulate most behaviors that are criminal in
nature.42 Societal values and beliefs regarding certain acts often trigger legislative
action in the field of criminal law. 43 In determining the behaviors that warrant
criminalization, the necessary preconditions focus on identifying the objects of moral
concern.44
Despite the fact that not all behaviors considered immoral or unethical justify
criminal penalties, moral and legal sanctions often result when private gains and
utility from undesirable conduct are particularly significant. 45 Take, for example, the
criminal outlaw of prostitution, rape, murder, and theft. Most would agree that these
actions are not only illegal but also immoral. Without legal intervention against these
immoral acts, criminals stand to gain insurmountable private benefits, both in
economic terms and their power and control over the livelihood of others. 46
b. Legislating Morality in Contract Law
In the history of contract law, it was once believed that “contracts were made in
the presence of God and consequently certain moral standards were implicit in
creating and executing the agreement.” 47 In present day, evidence of these implicit
38 See Steven Shavell, Law Versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct, 4 AM. L. ECON.
REV.
227,
246-51
(2001),
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/shavell/pdf/4_Amer_Law_Econ_Rev_227.pdf.
39

Id.

40

Id. at 248-49.

41

John Danaher, Enforcing Morality Through Criminal Law, PHILOSOPHICAL
DISQUISITIONS
(May
10,
2014),
http://philosophicaldisquisitions.blogspot.com/2014/05/enforcing-morality-through-criminallaw.html.
42

Richard C. Fuller, Morals and the Criminal Law, 32 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 624, 628
(1942).
43

Id.

44

Danaher, supra note 41, at 1.

45

Shavell, supra note 38, at 246-47.

46

Id.

47

Brad Reid, Morality Is Part of Contract Law, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 10, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brad-reid/morality-is-part-of-contr_b_1195172.html.
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moral standards are still embedded in the obligations of this legal doctrine,48 and it is
unlikely that they will fade. Legal duties created in the field of contract law are often
justified by their relationship to the moral obligations imposed on every agent. 49
Specifically, many scholars claim that contract law is justifiable through the
enforcement of moral commitments to keep one’s promises. 50 Because the
enforcement of contracts is interchangeable with the notion of promises, morality
plays a central role in shaping the possible remedies for the breach of such promises.
In the event of a breach of contract, one party may suffer significant loss, which
invokes the notion of unfairness. 51 In determining what is fair and unfair regarding
the subsequent execution and outcome of agreements, moral beliefs and values are
echoed as a result.52
Morality also plays a vital part in how courts interpret agreements that are
ambiguous in nature.53 In the context of contractual interpretation, the doctrine of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a specific example of the
interplay between morality and the law. 54 Courts consider the doctrine to be the
“backstop” that “requires a party in a contractual relationship to refrain from
arbitrary or unreasonable conduct which has the effect of preventing the other party
to the contract from receiving the fruits of the bargain.” 55 Court reliance on the
doctrine of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing reflects moral views
in determining which types of behaviors constitute arbitrariness and
unreasonableness, which bears on the legality and enforcement of an agreement.56
c. Legislating Morality in Civil Rights Law
Undoubtedly, American civil rights laws have moral-based origins.57 With
promotion of fairness and equality as the underlying objective behind civil rights
laws, the concepts are categorically equivalent to morality. 58 The emergence of
America’s civil rights laws would not have come into existence without the gradual
48

Id.

49 Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
1603, 1612-14 (2009).
50

Id. at 1613.

51

Reid, supra note 47.

52 Id. (quoting Clean Harbors, Inc. v. Safety-Kleen, Inc. (citing Alliance Data Systems
Corp. v. Blackstone Capital) (“The Court noted approvingly that this covenant is a ‘backstop’
that ‘requires a party in a contractual relationship to refrain from arbitrary or unreasonable
conduct which has the effect of preventing the other party to the contract from receiving the
fruits of the bargain.’”)).
53

Id.

54

Id.

55

Id. (quoting Alliance Data Systems Corp. v. Blackstone Capital).

56

Id.

57

Christopher Beem, A Symposium on Legislating Morality: Can Legislation Solve our
Moral
Problems,
COMM.
NETWORK,
https://www2.gwu.edu/~ccps/rcq/legislating_morality.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2017).
58

Green, supra note 37, at 1046.
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evolution of society’s moral views that all citizens deserve equal treatment. This
notion—that fairness and equality in our civil protections result from morality—is
arguably corroborated by the historical outlawing of behaviors once viewed as
acceptable but subsequently deemed immoral. 59
One of the earliest examples of this evolution is the abolition of slavery in the
United States. Once viewed as acceptable, slavery gradually became immoral. 60
Once society’s moral views regarding slavery changed, legislation soon followed. 61
Similarly, civil rights laws prohibiting discrimination of historically oppressed
groups also delineate moral norms that all citizens should be protected from unjust
and prejudicial treatment, regardless of race, age, gender, sex, or capabilities.62
B. Review of Judicial and Legislative Dependence on Morality in Family Law
Jurisprudence
1. Correlation between Moral and Legal Duties in Family Law
Similar to how morals are basic to the everyday function of families, morality
has also played a central role in the development of family law. 63 Generally, law
typically intervenes in family life when urgent moral issues arise.64 When such issues
arise, it is especially true in the field of family law that society and legislators
believe the law should be based on moral principles.65 The emphasis on morality in
family jurisprudence results in the deliberate incorporation of moral principles into
statutes and case law.66 Whereas in other areas of law courts may be more hesitant to
rely entirely on morality in justifying their decisions, it has generally been the norm
for family law courts and statutes to do so explicitly.67 In fact, in family law
jurisprudence, it is common for courts to waive requirements of fact-based
justifications that fail to incorporate morality into their decisions. 68
The reality is that law and morality are essentially interchangeable in the field of
family law. As scholar Katharine Bartlett notes, “Family law is soaked in moral
judgments that both reinforce the law and are reinforced by it. At some level, the
question is not whether family law should reflect moral principles but what those

59

Bauman, supra note 23, at 3 (discussing the abolition of slavery).

60

Id.

61

Id.

62

Id. at 3-4.

63

Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law,
83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1806 (1985).
64

Id. at 1806.

65

Id.

66 For instance, marriage and divorce law reflects moral beliefs. See id. at 1809, 1811.
Child support laws and social security regulations reflect moral beliefs as well. Id. at 18121813.
67

Murphy, supra note 36, at 1115-16.

68

See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 3 Day 37, 41-42, 50-51 (Conn. 1808); Castle v. Castle,
473 N.E.2d 803, 806 (Ohio 1984).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017

9

464

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:455

principles will be.”69 With regard to which moral principles family law should
consider, some scholars assert that family law should aim to promote “a substantive
moral vision of commitment and responsibility.” 70 Meanwhile, others envision
family law as an opportunity to emphasize issues of obligation and moral
responsibility.71
In recent trends, however, this reliance on morality has begun to shift, as
morality maintains its significance in some aspects of family law and diminishes in
other areas.72 Some scholars contend that this new shift in the placement of moral
concerns in family law should be “grounded in equality, fairness, commitment, and
nurturance.”73 Despite the decreasing significance of morality in some areas of
family law, what has remained consistent is that the support of dependents still has
meaning.74 From a philosophical standpoint, scholars contend, “[T]he nurturing of
children out to be included in our list of the central or the cardinal virtues. Indeed
even one wishes to distinguish between public virtues and private virtues, the virtue
of nurturing children belongs high on both lists.” 75 It was these types of moral
concerns and beliefs that led to the importance of maintaining and supporting
vulnerable dependents.76
a. Correlation between Moral and Legal Duty to Support “Dependents”: Child
Support
Courts have uniformly reiterated that “we see no difference in principle between
the duty imposed upon the parent to support the [minor] child and the obligation to
care for the [disabled] adult, who is equally, if not more, dependent upon the
parent.”77 Because the principles amongst these two types of support obligations are
related, it is essential to first examine the evolution of the duty to support minor
children.

69 Katharine T. Bartlett, Saving the Family from the Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
809, 816 (1998). See generally Jennifer Wriggins, Marriage Law and Family Law: Autonomy,
Interdependence and Couples of the Same Gender, 41 B.C. L. REV. 265, 287-88 (2000)
(discussing different scholars’ views on the role of morality in family law).
70 Wriggins, supra note 69, at 289. Milton C. Regan argues that family law should not be
based on a model of individual private ordering but should “promote a substantive moral
vision of commitment and responsibility.” MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE
PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 4 (1993).
71
See Wriggins, supra note 69, at 289 (quoting Martha L. Minow, All in the Family and
in all Families: Membership, Loving and Owing, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 275, 306 (1992-93)).
72 See id. at 289 (quoting Naomi R. Cahn, Review Essay: The Moral Complexities of
Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 225, 238 (1997)).
73

Id. at 289 (quoting Cahn, supra note 73, at 238)).

74

See Murphy, supra note 35 at 1128.

75

Id. at 1129 (quoting Michael J. Meyer, Family Virtues and the Common Good, 36
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 409, 413-14 (1996)).
76

See id. at 1129-30.

77

Crain v. Mallone, 113 S.W. 67, 68 (Ky. 1908) (discussing rationale for imposing
financial obligation on parents to support disabled adult beyond the age of majority).
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Our laws regulate “dependents” and their support through policies reinforced by
morality; the policies are also aimed at governing the social and material
environments the dependents inhabit and the resources to which they have access. 78
Social policy, by its very definition, can have a cause-and-effect type influence on
the welfare of dependents.79 As a result, one cannot merely disregard the impact that
morally driven policies derived from religious, racial, ideological, scientific, and
philosophical ideas have had on the legal emergence of support obligations. 80
b. Historical Views of Children: From Child Labor to Fairytale View
In order to understand the role morality played in the development of the legal
obligation to support dependent children, it is first critical to examine the evolving
perceptions of children. The concept of “childhood” has historically been the
product of social construction, which has continued to change and evolve. 81 Prior to
the commencement of the nineteenth century, legal and societal views of
“childhood,” as we perceive it today, were nonexistent. 82 During this period, familial
roles involved utilizing children as economic devices, allowing caregivers the
autonomy to be dependent, in part, on their children as a means for financial
sustainability.83 As early as the medieval era, historians began identifying society’s
lack of recognition of “childhood” as a distinct stage of life. 84 During the medieval
era, children were virtually indistinguishable from their adult counterparts and
deemed fully integrated members of the community. 85 Symbolized socially as young
adults, children as young as seven years old were apprenticed and used as tools for
acquiring earnings.86
78 For purposes of this Note, “dependents” refers to children and the severely disabled.
Annette Ruth Appell, Child-Centered Jurisprudence and Feminist Jurisprudence Exploring
the Connections and Tensions: The Pre-Political Child of Child-Centered Jurisprudence, 46
HOUS. L. REV. 703, 708 (2009) (quoting Allison James et al., Care and Control in the
Construction of Children's Citizenship, in CHILDREN AND CITIZENSHIP 85, 88 (Antonella
Invernizzi & Jane Williams eds., 2008)).
79 The Department of Social Policy at the London School of Economics defines social
policy as “an interdisciplinary and applied subject concerned with the analysis of societies’
responses
to
social
need.”
About
Us,
LONDON
SCH.
OF
ECON.,
http://www.lse.ac.uk/socialPolicy/AboutUs/introduction.aspx (last updated Sept. 28, 2016).
80

See Appell, supra note 78, at 708-11.

81

See Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order:
The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1085-86 (1991).
82

Id. at 1093-94.

83

See Appell, supra note 78, at 745-46.

84 PHILIPPE. ARIÈS, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE 20–32
(Robert Baldick, trans.) (1970) (discussing stages of life in other civilizations and cultures).
85

See Ainsworth, supra note 81, at 1092-93 (discussing that the primary age-based
boundary was drawn at infancy and that a time of physical dependence ended roughly at age
seven during this era).
86 Jim Vandergriff, Factors Influencing The Development of The Idea of Childhood in
Europe
and
America,
http://faculty.knox.edu/jvanderg/201_Website_S_08/HistoryofChildhood.html (last visited
January 29, 2017).
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For much of the eighteenth century, families valued children mainly because the
child was able to contribute to the household economy. 87 This often meant that
children were subjected to agricultural labor for the sole purpose of raising revenue
for the family unit.88 One historian notes, “[T]he services or wages of a child over
ten was one of the most valuable assets a man could have.”89
The ideology of children as “economic tools” continued to progress into the era
when the U.S. economy transitioned from agriculture to industry. 90 Consequently,
the rise in the Industrial Revolution continued to profoundly affect the historical
views of children.91 As early as 1870 through World War I, the Industrial Revolution
brought a rise in factories, coupled with a new demand for abled laborers.92 The
sudden growth of “factory towns” was, therefore, accompanied by urbanization,
which relocated families from rural to urban America. 93 The influx of urbanization
incidentally led to the need for families to achieve more money as opposed to
commodities.94 The demand for more cash meant that lower-income families were
faced with the reality that the entire family, including children, were crucial
economic assets for meeting the needs of the family unit. 95 Factory employers even
preferred child labor because employers viewed children, compared to adults, as
easier to manage, cheaper, and less likely to strike. 96
Prior to the nineteenth century, there was a presumption that able-bodied children
must work.97 Thus, during this time frame, there was no legislation to support the
interest of working children.98 This lack of regulation stemmed from the belief that
“the policy of our laws which are ever watchful to promote industry, did not mean to
compel a father to maintain his idle and lazy children in ease and indolence.”99
87 Drew D. Hansen, The American Invention of Child Support: Dependency and
Punishment in Early American Child Support Law, 108 YALE L. J. 1123, 1129 (1999).
88 See generally Appell, supra note 77, at 745-46 (discussing the transition from children
working in the fields to factory laborers).
89

MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 6 (1994).

90

Marie A. Failinger, “Too Cheap Work for Anybody but Us”: Toward a Theory and
Practice of Good Child Labor, 35 RUTGERS L. J. 1035, 1082 (2004).
91 E. Ill. Univ., Childhood Lost: Child Labor During the Industrial Revolution, EIU.EDU,
http://www.eiu.edu/eiutps/childhood.php (last visited Jan. 29, 2017).
92

Id.

93

Failinger, supra note 90, at 1048.

94

See Hansen, supra note 87, at 1053, 1131-32.

95

See E. Ill. Univ., supra note 91.

96

Child Labor in U.S. History, CHILD LABOR PUB. EDUC. PROJECT,
http://www.continuetolearn.uiowa.edu/laborctr/child_labor/about/us_history.html (last visited
Jan. 29 2017).
97

See Hansen, supra note 87, at 1129-30.

98

Id.

99 Sande L. Buhai, Parental Support of Adult Children with Disabilities, 91 MINN L. REV.
710, 713 (2007) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
437 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) (1765)).
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It was not until the turn of the nineteenth century that the burdens of financial
dependency shifted from children to their caregivers. 100 Historians have noticed the
progression of societal conceptions of children as society began to recognize our
modern views of “childhood.”101 During the Enlightenment and Romantic Era, “the
view of children as economic assets began to give way to a more romantic, idealized
view of childhood among the middle and upper classes.” 102 Childhood symbolized a
distinct stage of life that required special effort to care for a child’s needs.103
c. Changing Views Led to Emergence of Moral Duty to Support Dependent Children
The societal change in viewing children at the onset of the nineteenth century
brought forth new moral notions of parental responsibility.104 With the emergence of
child labor laws, the presumption that children were economic tools was replaced by
beliefs that children are vulnerable and wholly dependent on adult guidance, making
the child’s care the leading interest.105 From a philosophical standpoint, childhood
was completely redefined, and children were deemed prospectively different from
adults.106 This newly idealized view of childhood subsequently led to the emergence
of a moral obligation to support children. 107 From this point forward, society
regarded parents as the source of guidance and care for their dependent children.
There have been competing justifications behind the gradual emergence of the
moral duty that parents have to support their children. 108 One justification for such a
duty can be traced to religious beliefs and views regarding the relationship between
parents and their children.109 Because “[t]he United States is one of the most
religious countries in the world,”110 it is fathomable that views embedded within
certain religions have played a significant role in guiding parental commitments to
their children.
Specifically, there are roots of parents’ moral duties to support their children
ingrained in Christian beliefs. 111 From beginning to end, the Christian Bible not only
100

Id. at 713-15.

101 John Clarke, Histories of Childhood, in CHILDHOOD STUDIES: AN INTRODUCTION 5,
(Dominic
Wyse,
ed.
2004),
http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/content/bpl_images/content_store/sample_chapter/0631
233962/wyse%2002chap01.pdf.
102

Hansen, supra note 87, at 1129.

103

Id.

104

See Clarke, supra note 101, at 9-10.

105

Id. at 9.

106 Arlene Skolnick, Children’s Rights, Children’s Development, in THE FUTURE
CHILDHOOD AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 138, 150 (Lamar T. Empey ed., 1979).
107

Id. at 151.

108

See Buhai, supra note 99, at 737-38.

109

See id. at 738.

OF

110 Susan D. Holloway, The Role of Religious Beliefs in Early Childhood Education:
Christian and Buddhist Preschools in Japan, EARLY CHILDHOOD RESEARCH AND PRACTICE,
Fall 1999. http://ecrp.uiuc.edu/v1n2/holloway.html.
111

See Buhai, supra note 99, at 738-39.
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references the importance of children, but also speaks to parents’ duties to support
them.112 Christian scripture teaches, “Children are a heritage from the Lord, offspring
a reward from him. Like arrows in the hands of a warrior are children born in one’s
youth. Blessed is the man whose quiver is full of them”"113 With the underlying view
that children are an important gift from God, the Bible repeatedly places great
emphasis on a parent’s duty to provide for them.114 Christian beliefs even go so far as
to deem parents immoral and infidel if they fail to provide for their own children. 115
Although morality does not necessarily implicate religious origins, another
leading justification behind the moral obligation of dependent support stems from
natural law principles.116 According to English jurist William Blackstone, “The duty
of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children . . . is an obligation laid on
them not only by nature herself, but by their own proper act, in bringing them into
the world.”117 Blackstone reasoned, “By begetting them, therefore, they have entered
into a voluntary obligation to endeavor, as far as in them lies, that the life which they
have bestowed shall be supported and preserved.”118
The natural law theory that parents must support children stems from the belief
that children do not have the ability to provide for themselves. 119 It has been
continually contemplated and agreed that “[t]he wants and weaknesses of children
render it necessary that some person maintains them, and the voice of nature has
pointed out the parents as the most fit and proper persons.” 120 Furthermore, natural
law theory provides, “The obligation on the part of the parent to maintain the child
continues until the latter is in a condition to provide for its own maintenance.” 121
Thus, Blackstone believed that the “insuperable degree of affection between parents
and their children was sufficient evidence of parental support to obviate the need for
legal sanctions.”122
112

See id. at 738.

113

Psalm 127:3-5 (New Int’l).

114 “Behold, the third time I am ready to come to you; and I will not be burdensome to
you: for I seek not yours, but you: for the children ought not to lay up for the parents, but the
parents for the children.” 2 Corinthians 12:14 (King James). “And in all the land were no
women found so fair as the daughters of Job: and their father gave them inheritance among
their brethren.” Job 42:15 (King James). “A good person leaves an inheritance for their
children’s children, but a sinner’s wealth is stored up for the righteous.” Proverbs 13:22 (King
James).
115

“But if any provide not for his own, and specially for those of his own house, he hath
denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel.” 1 Timothy 5:8 (King James).
116

Buhai, supra note 99, at 737, 747.

117

Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 616 (N.C. 1947) (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE’S
COMMENTARIES 419 (Lewis ed. 1897)).
118

Id. at 616-17.

119

Id. at 616.

120

Id. at 617 (quoting C. JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 190 (Lecture

29)).
121

Id.

122

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *424, *448.
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d. Noncustodial Parents’ Legal Duties to Support Dependent Children Rely on
Morality
Moral concern for the welfare of dependent children and the societal issues
related to their care transgressed into family law’s focus on noncustodial support
obligations.123 Child support laws have progressed and evolved significantly
throughout American history.124 In understanding the courts’ reliance on morality in
justifying support obligations, it is critical to view the reasoning provided in three of
the earliest and leading child support cases.125 Although it has been argued that the
purpose of these early child support cases was to curtail the problem of single parent
and child dependency on the public, this Note argues that the courts’ reasoning for
the payment of child support directly reflects the courts’ reliance on moral values as
leading justifications.
In 1808, the supreme court of Connecticut, in Stanton v. Stanton, allowed a wife
to recover from her ex-husband for the support provided to their children.126 The
Stanton court authorized recovery for the support of two of the children covered by
the custody decree on the grounds that “[p]arents are bound by law to maintain,
protect, and educate their legitimate children, during their infancy, or nonage.” 127
The court allowed recovery for support of the third child on the basis that “[t]he
infant cast on the world must seek protection and safety where it can be found; and
where, with more propriety can it apply, than to the next friend, nearest relative, and
such as are most interested in its safety and happiness?”128 The court’s decision
lacked justifications independent of the moral values relied on in reaching their
conclusion.129
In 1816, a New York trial court, in Van Valkinburgh v. Watson, considered a
claim to recover the cost of a coat sold to a son on his father’s credit.130 In resolving
the issue, the court relied solely on the notion that:
A parent is under a natural obligation to furnish necessaries for his infant
children; and if the parent neglect that duty, any other person who
supplies such necessaries is deemed to have conferred a benefit on the
delinquent parent, for which the law raises an implied promise to pay on
the part of the parent.131
Lastly, in the 1858 case of Tomkins v. Tomkins, a father abandoned his young
child and wife. Because of the mother’s destitute state, the young child was sent to
123

Murphy, supra note 67, at 1190.

124

Hansen, supra note 87, at 1125-26.

125 See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 3 Day 37 (Conn. 1808); Tomkins v. Tomkins, 11 N.J. Eq.
512 (Ch. 1858); Van Valkinburgh v. Watson, 13 Johns. 480 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816).
126

Stanton, 3 Day 37.

127

Id. at 55.

128

Id. at 57-58.

129

Id. at 41.

130

Van Valkinburgh, 13 Johns. 480.

131

Id.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017

15

470

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:455

stay with her grandmother, who took on the responsibility of caring for the child. 132
In finding an obligation for the father to pay support for the expenses covered by
another caregiver, the New Jersey Court of Chancery reasoned, “If a case can be
suggested where the moral obligation of a father to provide for his offspring can be
enforced as a legal one, it would be difficult to find one more apposite than this.” 133
The court further rationalized that “[t]here is no evidence that for the fifteen years
the child was under the care of its grandmother, the father ever made any inquiry as
to its whereabouts or welfare.”134 The court declared:
Now, in view of all these facts, if there was any doubt as to the legal
obligation of the father to provide for his child, and of his legal liability to
such as should supply that child with the necessaries of life, the moral
obligation is so strong that a court of equity would feel but little inclined
to grant relief, on any such ground as that the moral obligation had been
converted into a legal one.135
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Necessity of Legislating Morality for Support of Disabled Adult Children:
Why Ohio Domestic Relations Courts Should Have Power to Initiate Support for
Disabled Adults
1. Connection between Moral and Legal Duty to Support “Dependents”: Disabled
Adult Support
Generally, the obligation to support children until they have obtained the age of
majority is imposed on parents by law.136 However, in many jurisdictions today,
court decisions and legislative enactments go beyond the recognition of a mere duty
to support children and also recognize the duty of parental support of disabled adult
children as a matter of family law. 137 Nevertheless, how did courts and legislators
come to establish this new arena of family law jurisprudence when parents originally
only had a moral and legal obligation to support their minor children? From a careful
examination of historical views of the severely disabled, coupled with societal values
and beliefs about their indefinite dependence on others for support and care, the
answer to this question undoubtedly originates from morality.
When reviewing Ohio court decisions and laws, 138 as well as other jurisdictions’
stances on the duty to support disabled children through adulthood, it is evident that
courts and legislators began to recognize the rise of moral concerns relating to the
continued need for care and support of disabled children once they reach adult status.
132

Tomkins v. Tomkins, 11 N.J. Eq. 512 (Ch. 1858).

133

Id. at 512.

134

Id.

135

Id. at 517-18.

136

The Duty to Support Adult Disabled Children, NAT’L LEGAL RES. GRP. INC. (1997),
http://www.divorcesource.com/research/dl/childsupport/97oct188.shtml (citing 59 Am. Jur. 2d
Parent and Child § 89 (1987); 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 62 (1978)).
137

Id.

138

See infra Section III.A.1.c.
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These moral concerns ultimately demonstrated that legal intervention was necessary
to resolve the problem of what should be done for the aid of disabled adult children.
As a resolution, courts and lawmakers began to rely heavily on morality in deeming
parents the responsible source for the aid of these individuals. 139
a. Historical View of Disabled Adults: From Dehumanized to Deinstitutionalized
In examining the intermingling between morality and the subsequent obligation
to support disabled adults, a basic understanding of the development of views
towards the disabled is key. While today there is a general acceptance of empathy
and special attention afforded to this group of individuals, from a historical
perspective, this empathy has not always been present.140
As early as the latter half of the twelfth century when religion was the main
authority in guiding everyday life, negative views towards the disabled were the
norm.141 There existed a general belief that the disabled—specifically, the mentally
ill—were possessed by the devil or evil spirits. 142 Consequently, individuals who fit
within this category were often whipped, tortured, and burned at the stake.143
Similarly, during early history, there was virtually no aid and financial support
afforded to the disabled.144 Individuals suffering from an array of disabling
conditions were often ejected from hospitals and poor shelters, having to rely on the
humiliation of displaying their disabilities as a form of entertainment in return for
food and shelter.145
Beginning in the early nineteenth century when science began to substitute
religious authority, societal views changed from perceiving the disabled as having
spiritual defects to an understanding that disabilities resulted of genetic deficits.146
With this change in view, society began to believe that support and care of disabled
adults shifted to the public, with reliance solely on doctors, educators, and social
workers as their custodians.147 State mental hospitals began to emerge as the first
formal system of care for the intellectually disabled in the United States.148 While it
may have been thought that the emergence of these institutions was to curtail prior
inhumane treatment of the disabled, in reality, such negative views and treatment of
this group became exacerbated.149
139

Buhai, supra note 99, at 716-17.

140 See TEACHING FOR DIVERSITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE app. 14C (Maurianne Adams, Lee
Anne Bell, & Pat Griffin eds., 2nd ed. 2007).
141

Id.

142

Id.

143

Id.

144

Id.

145

Id.

146

Id.

147

Id.

148

Catherine K. Harbour & Pallab K. Maulik, History of Intellectual Disabilities, INT’L
ENCYC. REHABILITATION (2010), http://cirrie.buffalo.edu/encyclopedia/en/article/143/.
149

Id.
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Starting in the late 1800s and early 1900s, people with disabilities were
segregated from the rest of the population into isolated institutions. 150 The conditions
in these institutions, however, were far from humane, and this period of
institutionalization became characterized as a “cruel and oppressive period.”151
During the institutionalization era, a eugenics movement surfaced. 152 The goal of
segregating the disabled was to protect the rest of the population from them while
simultaneously limiting the disabled persons’ chances of reproduction.153 Because
the disabled were perceived as carrying characteristics that weakened the human
race, thousands of disabled individuals were sterilized to prevent passing undesirable
genes on to future generations.154 Some eugenics advocates even went so far as
supporting the euthanasia of disabled children to avoid passing on their genes. 155
Sterilization, however, was not the only startling practice used on the disabled
during this period. In unwarranted efforts to rid the intellectually disabled from
undesirable mental symptoms, professionals implemented several inhumane and
torturous methods of therapy.156 One method involved the implementation of the
“malarial therapy.”157 This method consisted of injecting malarial blood into
intellectually disabled individuals, based on beliefs that mental symptoms sometimes
disappeared in mental patients suffering from typhoid fever. 158 Another method of
ridding mental symptoms involved the “insulin coma therapy,” which was designed
to place patients in a hypoglycemic state that caused comatose in an effort to rewire
the brain and prevent characteristics associated with mental illness. 159
The injection of metrazol was also used on institutionalized patients to induce
convulsions because it was believed that epileptics rarely suffered from such mental
illnesses.160 In addition, institutions experimented with the use of “electroshock
therapy,” which sent electric currents through the brain, in hopes of quickly
reversing symptoms of certain mental illness. 161 Professionals in these institutions
even went so far as performing surgical procedures, which have been referred to as a
150

Id.

151

Luana Olivas, Helping Them Rest in Peace: Confronting the Hidden Crisis Facing
Aging Parents of Disabled Children, 10 ELDER L.J. 393, 399 (2002) (quoting DAVID L.
BRADDOCK, THE STATE OF THE STATES IN DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 16 (5th ed. 1998)).
152

Savanna Logsdon-Breakstone, Disability History 101: The Rise of the Institution (Apr.
23, 2012), https://disabilityrightnow.wordpress.com/2012/04/23/dis-hist-101-institutions/.
153

Harbour & Maulik, supra note 148.

154

Id.

155

Id.

156

See generally Renato M.E. Sabbatiri, BRAIN & Mind, The History of Shock Therapy in
Psychiatry, http://www.cerebromente.org.br/n04/historia/shock_i.htm (last visited Feb. 5,
2017).
157

Id.

158

Id.

159

Id.

160

Id.

161

Id.
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lobotomy.162 Lobotomy involved severing the nerve fibers of the frontal lobe of the
brain to completely prevent the reemergence of symptoms associated with mental
disabilities.163
Not only were nineteenth-century therapy treatments brutal, but the everyday
conditions within the institutions were also substandard.164 The disabled were often
punished severely for resisting the control of strait jackets and mechanical restraints
as well as being placed in isolation for days on end. 165 The dehumanized view of the
disabled, along with a push for institutionalization in poor-conditioned facilities,
remained the norm until views began to change, and pushes for deinstitutionalization
began to arise, in the late twentieth century.166
b. Changing Views Led to Emergence of Moral Duty to Support Disabled Adults
Starting in the early 1970s, society’s views toward the disabled began to
change.167 From this point forward, there has been a significant decline in the
institutionalization of disabled patients. 168 For the past four decades, there has now
emerged the universal trend in the United States for individuals with disabilities to
live in inclusive settings as opposed to exclusive settings, which were the norm prior
to the late twentieth century.169 Specifically, “Whereas before, families were
pressured to [send the disabled away to be isolated in institutions], they are now
expected to be substantially involved in their care, if not directly responsible for
it.”170 The mass deinstitutionalization, coupled with the evolved view that the family
should support and care for the disabled in the least restrictive environment, directly
reflects the emergence of the moral duty to support disabled adults.
Many states ultimately began to recognize that a moral duty existed for a parent
to continue to support children post-minority if the children were unable to support
themselves due to a disabling condition. 171 This moral duty found its roots in part
from statutory provisions that assigned criminal penalties for not supporting minor
children.172 However, there is also compelling evidence that this new rise in the
162 Eds.
of
Encyc.
Britannica,
Lobotomy,
ENCYC.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/lobotomy (last updated Dec. 17, 2012).
163

BRITANNICA,

Id.

164 Dennis Felty, A Brief History: As Remembered by Dennis Felty, KEYSTONE HUM.
SERVS., https://www.keystonehumanservices.org/about-us/history (last visited Feb 5, 2017).
165

Id.

166

TEACHING FOR DIVERSITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE app. 14C, supra note 140.

167

Olivas, supra note 151, at 398-99.

168 CLAIRE LAVIN & KENNETH J. DOKA, OLDER ADULTS
DISABILITIES 15 (Jon Hendricks ed., 1999).

WITH

DEVELOPMENTAL

169

Harbour & Maulik, supra note 148; see also Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785
(M.D. Ala. 1971) (articulating a right of residents in state mental institutions to live in the
least restrictive environment); see also Horacek v. Exon, 357 F. Supp. 71 (D. Neb. 1973).
170

Olivas, supra note 151, at 398-99.

171

Id.

172

Hansen, supra note 87, at 1150.
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recognition of a moral duty for parents to support their disabled adult children also
can be traced to principles of natural law, humanitarian perspectives, and religious
views.173
i. Moral Duties to Support Disabled Adults Stemmed from Natural Law
Just as natural law played a role in the morality underpinning a parent’s duty to
support minor children, natural law also influenced the moral obligation of parents to
support disabled adult dependents.174 The theory of natural law involves “the
unwritten body of universal moral principles that underlie the ethical and legal
norms by which human conduct is sometimes evaluated and governed.” 175
Proponents of natural law theory believe that the government must incorporate
universal, moral principles within natural law into legal systems before justice can be
achieved.176 Therefore, scholars subsequently have described a parent’s moral
obligation to his or her disabled adult children as an obligation of “natural law,”
originating from the responsibility of bringing the child into the world.177
Blackstone similarly characterized a parent’s duty to support disabled adult
children as “a principle of natural law.” 178 Specifically, he argued that as a matter of
natural law, necessaries must be supplied for those who are incompetent and not
capable of working.179 Accordingly, philosopher John Locke also believed that as a
matter of natural law, all individuals in society, including the disabled, have the right
of preservation.180 He argued that individuals have a natural right to the material
necessities for survival.181 Under the theory of natural law, the voice of nature has
deemed the parent the person fit to provide such material necessities.182 The moral
duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children continues
indefinitely until the child can provide for herself under this principle.183 According
to natural law theorists, if the child never reaches the point where she is able to care
for herself, the moral obligation continues. 184

173

Buhai, supra note 99, at 720, 727, 733, 737.

174

Id. at 737.

175 Natural
Law,
THE
FREE
DICTIONARY,
http://legaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Natural+Law+Theory (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
176

See generally Buhai, supra note 99, at 716.

177

Id. at 737.
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BLACKSTONE, supra note 122, at 435.
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Id. at 437.

180

JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Rod Hay ed., London 1823).
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2 CHANCELLOR JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, Lecture 29, 189, 190
(1826-30).
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184

Id.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss3/10

20

2017]

IN THE “BEST INTERESTS” OF THE DISABLED

475

ii. Moral Duties to Support Disabled Adults Stemmed from Humanitarian Rules
The emergence of societal views that parents are morally responsible for the
support and maintenance of their disabled adult children also originates from
humanitarian principles.185 Under theories of humanity, all citizens have moral
obligations to treat others with kindness and benevolence.186 From a humanitarian
perspective, there also exists a moral imperative to assist those in need. 187 Scholars
often have attributed a parent’s moral obligation to support disabled adult children to
the humanitarian perspective that it is the right thing to do.188
For example, philosopher Immanuel Kant characterized such a moral duty from
the humanitarian point of view.189 According to Kant:
Children, as persons, have, at the same time, an original congenital right,
distinguished from mere hereditary right, to be reared by the care of their
parents till they are capable of maintaining themselves; and this provision
becomes immediately theirs by law, without any particular juridical Act
being required to determine it.190
Kant also believed that parents “have brought a Being into the world who becomes
in fact a Citizen of the world, and they have placed that Being in a state which they
cannot be left to treat with indifference.” 191 As discussed in the following section,
morality that evolved from both natural law and humanitarian principles is heavily
relied upon when justifying the legal duty of parents to support their disabled adult
children.192
c. Noncustodial Parents’ Legal Duties to Support Disabled Adults Rely on Morality
Both natural law and humanitarian perspectives played a significant role in the
emergence of parents’ legal obligations to support their disabled adult children. It is
evident from courts’ analysis that reliance on these morality concerns justified their
decisions to provide an exception that disabled adults warrant continued support.
Courts even go so far as to rely solely on moral justifications in creating mandated
185 Public Library of Science, Why Do We Love Babies? Parental Instinct Region Found in
The
Brain,
SCIENCEDAILY
(Feb.
27,
2008),
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/02/080226213448.htm (summarizing Annukka
Lehtonen, et al., A Specific and Rapid Neural Signature for Parental Instinct, PLOS (Feb. 27,
2008), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0001664).
186

Kuangfei Xie, Kindness Ethics: A Possible Approach to Virtue Ethics, 4 EDUC. J. 189
(2015), http://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.edu.20150405.11.pdf.
187 Regina A. Nockerts & Peter W. Van Arsdale, A Theory of Obligation, J. HUMAN.
ASSISTANCE (May 12, 2008), https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/138.
188 Lawrence B. Solum, To Our Children’s Children’s Children: The Problems of
Intergenerational Ethics, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 163, 211-12 (2001).
189

Id.

190

IMMANUEL KANT, Rights of the Family as a Domestic Society, THE PHIL. OF LAW: AN
EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURIS. AS THE SCI. OF RT. 3, 114 (Edinburgh:
T. & T. Clark 1887) (1796).
191

Id. at 115.

192

See infra text accompanying notes 194-205.
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disabled adult support duties.193 Although most of the common law principles
focusing on morality were subsequently codified, this should not change the courts’
underlying rationale and justifications. Because most statutes regarding the support
of disabled adult children, including Section 3119.86 of the Ohio Revised Code,
codify common law principles, this Note argues that courts should adhere to such
underlying moral principles when interpreting whether they have jurisdiction over
such matters rather than focusing on technicalities.
Originally, most states did not impose a legal duty to continue supporting
disabled children post-majority.194 However, new legislation in the area of family
law began to surface when society adopted a new moral image of the family. 195 The
gradual appearance of societal concerns for the care of disabled adults created a new
moral image of family in terms of parents supportingtheir disabled adult children. A
general acceptance of a moral duty eventually transformed into a legal obligation to
support disabled adult children.
In 1984, the Ohio Supreme Court considered a parent’s continuing legal
obligation to support a disabled child once the child has reached adulthood. 196 The
case before the Ohio Supreme Court presented a common-law question of first
impression.197 The court held that, in the case of mentally or physically disabled
children, there is both a moral and legal duty for parents to support and maintain
disabled children through their adult life.198 Specifically, the court’s decision
provided, “[But] where a child is of weak body or mind, unable to care for itself after
coming of age, and remains unmarried and in the parent’s home, it has been held that
the . . . parent’s duty to support the child continues.”199 In reaching this conclusion
and creating a new common law principle, the court relied heavily on morality. 200 In
justifying the decision, the court did not mention any independent fact-justifications;
instead, it cited only to moral principles derived from the theory of natural law. 201
The decision in Castle later triggered the General Assembly to take action on the
issue, and the Assembly subsequently codified the holding from this landmark case
in 2001.202
Today, family law cases and statutes continue to rely on parents’ moral
obligations to support their disabled adult children when justifying this duty. In fact,
it is agreed that this moral obligation comprises the “theoretical underpinnings” of
the various common law and statutory authority holding parents responsible for the
193

See Buhai, supra note 99, at 718.

194

Amy P. Hauser, Note, Child Custody for Disabled Adults: What Kentucky Families
Need, 91 KY. L.J. 667, 669 (2002/2003).
195

Murphy, supra note 67.

196

Castle v. Castle, 15 Ohio St.3d 279 (1984).

197

Id.

198

Id. at 283.

199

Id. at 282.

200

See generally id.

201

Id.

202

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3119.86 (West 2016).
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support of disabled adults. 203 Like Ohio, other jurisdictions also rely on moral
obligations to support disabled adults derived from natural law, humanitarian
perspectives, and equitable reasons.204
B. “Shavell Approach”: Optimizing Desired Results by Supplementing Moral
Obligations with Legislation
Despite this trend of reliance on morality, Ohio courts are split as to whether they
have jurisdiction to initiate support after a disabled child turns eighteen. 205 In sum,
Ohio courts disagree as to whether they can rely on these morality concerns to justify
their jurisdiction to initiate support or whether they must disregard such concerns
and focus instead on technicalities. Because of the heavy reliance on morality in the
area of family law—particularly in the realm of support obligations to dependents—
this Note argues that courts should follow precedent and rely on morality concerns to
justify the jurisdiction and power to initiate support for disabled adults.
While the question of whether morality should be legislated is still a highly
debated topic, there are definite advantages in supplementing moral duties with legal
obligations. Although it may be true that not all moral norms need legal
reinforcement, and that regulating every aspect of morality is practically impossible,
there are certain occasions where the interplay between these two methods of
molding conduct are necessary. Notwithstanding the fact that society has the right to
condemn certain acts or omissions as immoral, special circumstances are required to
justify the intervention of the law.206 These special circumstances are described as
the provision of “sufficient safeguards against exploitation . . . particularly those who
are especially vulnerable because they are . . . weak in body or mind . . . or in a state
of special physical . . . or economic dependence.”207
Harvard Law School professor Steven Shavell accurately identifies the
circumstances under which morality and law are necessary for optimal results
regarding societal conduct.208 Under the “Shavell Approach,” it is essential to use
law in supplement of moral obligations when the larger picture justifies doing so. In
this case, the moral obligations extend to social benefits.209 The intertwining of law
and morality are mandated under this approach when “the expected private gain
203

48 A.L.R. 4TH 919, Postmajority Disability as Reviving Parental Duty to Support
Child, Westlaw (current).
204

See Buhai, supra note 99, at 728-30. Those states that rely on either morality derived
from natural law or humanity theories are: Alabama, New Jersey, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
and North Carolina. Id.
205 JUDGE DIANE M. PALOS, BALDWIN'S OH. PRAC. DOM. REL. L. § 19:5 (4TH ED.), Westlaw
(database updated Dec. 2016).
206 Lord
Patrick
Devlin,
Morals
and
the
Criminal
Law
24,
34,
http://fs2.american.edu/dfagel/www/Class%20Readings/Devlin/Devlin_Morals%20and%20th
e%20Criminal%20Law.pdf.
207

Id. at 35 (quoting The Wolfenden Report).

208

Shavell, supra note 38, at 246. For purposes of this Note, this author’s conclusions
relating to the overlap of law and morality are referred to as the “Shavell Approach.”
209

Id.
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from undesirable conduct is not too great, and the expected harm due to such
conduct is also not too great.”210
One underlying rationale behind such an approach to the intermingling of these
realms of shaping behaviors is based on the notion that moral ramifications alone are
insufficient to deter undesirable conduct when economic gains are high. 211 When an
individual stands to reap significant financial benefits, such enrichment often
supersedes the guilt behind the negative conduct, causing the individual to choose
economic incentives over moral conduct. Another justification for supplementing
morality with legality focuses on how the failures to prevent certain immoral actions
bear substantial consequences on society as whole.212 Under this circumstance,
Shavell rightfully believes that the greater good afforded to society in averting
unwanted behavior outweighs the extra expense of supplementing morality with
legislation.213
Shavell’s approach to law and morality is favorable for several reasons. First,
adherence to this approach is advantageous because it recognizes the distinctions
between morality and the law.214 Second, utilizing this approach is also beneficial
because it recognizes that meshing these two concepts is sometimes inessential.215
Lastly, the Shavell Approach is critical in analyzing which moral aspects warrant
regulation because the theory creates a clear and compelling formula for identifying
which moral domains to pursue legally.
1. Application of “Shavell Approach”: Initiation of Noncustodial Support of
Disabled Adult Children Requires Moral and Legal Overlap
In light of current legislation based on morals, issues relating to whether morality
should be legislated are beginning to dissolve. Instead, the focus shifts directly to
which moral aspects should be regulated.216 Despite evidence supporting the moral
domain behind family law, it is generally agreed that not every moral avenue within
family law justifies legal intervention.217 With this reality in mind, the issue now
becomes whether the moral obligation behind the support of disabled children
through adulthood requires legal pursuit in giving Ohio courts the authority to
initiate support for disabled adults. Viewing the issue in light of the compelling
210

Id. at 247.

211

Id.

212

Id.

213

Id.

214 Id. Such distinctions include crimes where the actor escapes punishment or is not
noticed. Supplementing morality with legislation is advantageous because moral incentives
alone will not control this. Id.
215 Id. Morality alone is enough to shape behavior for things like keeping promises or
lending a helping hand. Id. at 244-45. Laws do not need to be grounded in morality in
situations where “expected private gains from bad conduct are large and the expected harms
due to such conduct are also large.” Id. at 251.
216

Bauman, supra note 23.

217 Courtney G. Joslin, Not Equal Yet: Building Upon Foundations of Relationship
Equality: The Perils of Family Law Localism, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 623, 645-46 (Dec.
2014).
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Shavell Approach, the answer must be yes. Despite the current decline in reliance on
morality in various areas of family law, 218 Ohio legislators and courts should not
deviate from the adherence to moral norms with regard to justification for the
initiation of support for disabled adults.
In determining whether law is required to supplement the moral obligation of
such a duty, it is critical to carefully examine whether supplementing this moral duty
is justified by its social benefits under the Shavell Approach. In doing so, it is also
imperative to examine whether the expected harms resulting from the failure of
noncustodial parents to support their disabled adult children are also significant.
Then, it is necessary to determine whether these harms will afford the noncustodial
parent significant expected private gains associated with the undesirable conduct of
failing to support his or her disabled adult child.
After applying this approach, this Note concludes that legislating morality is
necessary to give courts the power to initiate disabled adult support.219 When
interpreting whether Ohio courts have jurisdiction to initiate such support pursuant
to Ohio Revised Code Section 3119.86, courts should focus on the moral concerns
underlying the enactment of this legislation, including the possibility that the
noncustodial parent may reap unjust economic gains for failing to provide such
support as well as the immense societal harm that would result from this conduct.
a. Unjust Economic Gains and Immense Societal Harm as a Result of Financially
Absent Noncustodial Parents
i. Harm to Custodial Parents: Financial Struggles and Limited Work
Participation
Marital strain often results from the financial tension and stress levels increased
from the challenges of raising disabled children into adulthood, and this tension
increases the probability of divorce.220 Beginning in the nineteenth century and
continuing to modern day, the trend toward maternal preference has become the
norm, and custody of “dependents” after a divorce is almost always awarded to the
mother.221 An increase in divorce rates, paired with maternal preference in custody
cases, creates a rise in single mothers who are forced into dealing with the high
demands of caring for their disabled child into adulthood. 222 In fact, more than onethird of all households containing a disabled child are single-mother households.223
Typically, disabled children needing continued care as adults often live at home
with their custodial parent as their main source of support.224 As a result, such care
218

Id. at 637-42.

219

See infra notes 220-52 and accompanying text.

220 ANTHONY GOUDIE ET AL., CARING FOR CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES IN OHIO: THE
IMPACT ON FAMILIES 3, 5, http://ddc.ohio.gov/Portals/0/OHFamImpStudyWhitePaperFINAL.pdf.
221

Hansen, supra note 87, at 1131 nn.40-41.

222

Id. at 1133.

223

GOUDIE ET. AL, supra note 220, at 7.

224

See Deborah Elbaum, Special Needs Care for Adult Children: Care Options,
CARE.COM, http://www.care.com/special-needs-care-options-p1145-q5906.html.
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comes at a substantial cost to custodial parents, placing the burden of determining
how to cover the costs incurred from medical and other related expenses solely on
his or her caregiver.225 Despite instinctual adaptations to the challenges associated
with caring for a disabled adult, the reality is that single custodial parents of disabled
adult children experience extreme financial hardship due to caregiving.226
It is undisputed that the cost of raising and caring for children as a divorced
custodial parent without noncustodial support creates substantial economic
adversity. However, the cost of caring for severely disabled children through
adulthood exacerbates economic hardships tremendously because severely disabled
children continue to need care throughout the entirety of their lives.227 In 2009, about
sixty-one million family caregivers in the United States provided care to an adult
with a disability.228 In 2011, the estimated economic value of the informal care
provided by family members was an astounding $234 billion.229
While many options for care may be helpful and available to dependent disabled
children and adults, these combined services can be extremely expensive. 230 These
expenses often force custodial parents to juggle multiple roles in relation to caring
for their disabled adult children in lieu of professional aid.231 Some of these roles
include handling medical bills and dealing with insurance claims, being responsible
for nursing procedures performed at home, providing transportation to medical
appointments and community services, and implementing care plans.232 More often
225

Id.

226

“In 2009, more than one in four (27 percent) caregivers of adults reported a moderate to
high degree of financial hardship as a result.” Lynn Feinberg, et al., Valuing the Invaluable:
2011 Update, The Growing Cost and Contribution of Family Caregiving, AARP PUB. POLICY
INST. (2016), http://www.aarp.org/ppi/info-2015/valuing-the-invaluable-2015-update.html; see
also CAREGIVING IN THE U.S. 2009, NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING AND AARP (Nov.
2009),
http://www.caregiving.org/data/Caregiving_in_the_US_2009_full_report.pdf
(discussing one in four caregivers had cut back on care-related spending because of economic
downturn).
227

See, e.g., Jiyeon Park et al., Impacts of Poverty on Quality of Life in Families of
Children
with
Disabilities,
68
EXCEPTIONAL
CHILD.,
151-52
(2002),
https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/bitstream/handle/1808/6058/FQL1_Impacts_of_poverty_on_Q
uality_8_07.pdf?sequence=1 (noting that 28% of disabled children, ages three to twenty-one,
are living in families whose total income is below the poverty threshold set by the U.S.
Census Bureau, whereas only 16% of children without disabilities in the same age group live
in poverty.).
228

Feinberg, et al., supra note 226, at 1.

229

Elizabeth Shell, The $234 Billion Job That Goes Unpaid, PBS NEWSHOUR (Nov. 25,
2013), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/the-234-billion-job-that-goes-unpaid/.
230 Deborah Elbaum, M.D., Special Needs Care for Adult Children: Cost of Care,
CARE.COM, http://www.care.com/special-needs-cost-of-care-p1145-q11809.html. The cost of
home health care aids and adult day care centers vary widely from state to state. Id. The
following figures provide a general guide for these costs: On average, the cost for a home
health care aid is $19/hour for a caregiver from a licensed agency. Id. The average cost per
day for an adult day care center is $61, or $15,250 per year based on five days a week for 50
weeks. Id.
231

Feinberg, et al., supra note 226, 4-5.

232

Id.
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than not, single custodial parents of the disabled willingly take on these sometimes
daunting tasks, but they do so at the cost of restricting the time the parent has to
devote to work.233 This sacrifice creates a “tug-of-war” effect between the custodial
parent’s need for employment due to the financial strains of caring for disabled adult
children and the limited time available for employment due to the amount of care
and attention that is required.234
Similarly, single custodial parents can face astronomical financial adversity if
they must leave the workforce entirely to meet their caregiver demands. Leaving the
workforce due to these high demands can consequently result in not only the loss of
earnings and social security benefits, but also the loss of career mobility and
employment benefits like health insurance and retirement savings.235As a result,
without the financial support of the noncustodial parent, both single parents and
society suffer immense harm. Absent noncustodial support, the single parent must
rely heavily on public welfare assistance to aid in the support of his or her disabled
adult child.
ii. Harm to Society: Dependency on State and Federal Welfare Assistance
When noncustodial parents fail to provide financial support, it is inevitable that
the custodial parent and disabled adult child utilize forms of public assistance,
resulting in welfare dependency and depletion.236 Adults with severe disabilities are
more likely to receive government benefits and other forms of cash assistance than
adults with non-severe disabilities or no disabilities, directing a large portion of
society’s tax dollars to the aid and benefit of this specific population. 237 Expansive
government, local entities, and programs have been implemented to provide aid to
the disabled adult population.238 The states and federal governments provide an array
of cash and benefits to alleviate the poverty and material hardship experienced by
233 Sunhwa Lee, et al., The Impact of Disabilities on Mothers’ Work Participation:
Examining Differences between Single and Married Mothers, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY
RES. 5 (February 2004).
234

Id.

235

Feinberg et al., supra note 226, at 6.

236

Phillip K. Robins, Child Support, Welfare Dependency, and Poverty, 76 THE AM.
ECON. REV. 768, 768 (1986) (“[R]esults suggest that child support enforcement may represent
an effective means for reducing welfare program costs, but is unlikely to have a dramatic
effect on reducing . . . welfare dependency.”).
237

See Brault, supra note 2, at 12.

Adults with severe disabilities were also more likely to receive SSI benefits (19.5
percent) and other forms of cash assistance (3.4 percent) than adults with non-severe
or no disabilities. Adults with severe disabilities were more than 3 times as likely to
receive SNAP benefits as those with no disabilities (28.1 percent compared with 8.3
percent). About 10.5 percent of adults aged 15 to 64 with severe disabilities received
public housing assistance compared with 2.6 percent of those with no disability.
Among those aged 65 and older, 8.5 percent of those with severe disabilities received
housing assistance compared to 2.3 percent of those with no disability.
Id.
238

Olivas, supra note 151, at 394.
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single parents caring for their disabled adult children.239 In addition to income
support, the federal government and the states provide health insurance to eligible
individuals with disabilities.240
Some scholars suggest that legislators creating support obligations were
ultimately concerned with single mothers’ and their dependents’ reliance on welfare
assistance.241 Evidence of this legislative concern appeared when English law began
to recognize the social and economic problem associated with single mothers raising
children by enacting “Poor Laws” in 1601.242 The Poor Laws imposed a duty on
fathers to reimburse local community resources for the costs of providing aid and
care to his indigent children and their single mothers.243 The Poor Laws only allotted
local community resources the privilege of recovering financially on behalf of the
239

Brault, supra note 2, at 12-13. These benefits include:

Social Security Income (SSI): Supplemental Security Income is a needs-based
program for the aged, blind, and disabled which is authorized by Title XVI of the
Social Security Act and administered by the Social Security Administration. To
qualify for SSI, a child or adult must have limited income and assets. SSI may be an
individual’s only form of income, or SSI can supplement other income, such as SSDI
or wages. It is possible to receive both SSI and SSDI.
Social Security Disability (SSDI): A benefit available to people who have paid taxes
to the Social Security Administration, a child may be eligible for this benefit if they
child became disabled before his or her 22nd birthday, is 18 years of age or older, is
not married, or has a parent who begins to get Social Security retirement or disability
benefits or has a parent with a qualifying work history who dies.
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF): The Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families program, also referred to as TANF, is an economic assistance
program that is operated by the federal government. Individuals who qualify for
TANF can receive a monthly cash benefit from the United States Department of
Health and Human Services. The TANF program is operated at the state level and
each state is given a block grant to design and administer the TANF program as they
see fit. The amount of assistance available to a family through this program will
depend on the family's household income and how many people are living in the
household.
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): SNAP benefits are available to
almost all low-income households. People receiving Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) are automatically eligible for SNAP benefits.
Id.
240 “Medicare, traditionally viewed as a benefit for the 65 and older population, is
available to nonelderly adults with disabilities who receive Social Security Disability Income.
Many state medical assistance/Medicaid programs also provide benefits to adults with
disabilities who might not otherwise qualify.” Id.
241

Marsha Garrison, Anatomy or Community? An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental
Obligation, 86 CAL. L. REV. 41, 42-43 (1998).
242 History of Child Support: Child Support Laws State by State, http://www.child-supportlaws-state-by-state.com/child-support.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
243

Garrison, supra note 241, at 49.
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child.244 Some argue that this is indicative of legislators’ concerns about unnecessary
depletion of welfare resources by the rise in single mothers and their dependents. 245
Without question, the concern about the unnecessary depletion of welfare resources,
which is still present today, was justified.
Currently, there are more than eighty federal welfare programs serving lowincome residents through cash, food, housing, medical care, and social services. 246
The nonpartisan Congressional Research Service indicates that as of 2011,
federal spending on these programs had reached $746 billion per year—
more than expenditures for Medicare ($480 billion), Social Security ($725
billion), or the military ($540 billion). In addition, state contributions into
federal welfare programs amounted to $201 billion annually, while
independent state programs contributed another $9 billion. All told,
means-tested welfare spending from federal and state sources (combined)
was $956 billion. America's $956 billion in annual welfare spending is
distributed among approximately 100 million people—i.e., one-third of
the U.S. population—who each month receive aid from at least one of the
country's 80+ welfare programs. Average benefits amount to
approximately $9,500 per recipient.247
Without noncustodial parents’ support of disabled dependents, taxpayers will
continue to bear the financial burden, and welfare resources will continue to deplete.
C. Ohio Courts Interpretations Regarding Jurisdiction to Initiate Support for
Disabled Adults Should Adhere to Moral Principles
Commonly, state legislatures codify legal decisions in response to the courts’
rationale.248 In Ohio, state legislators codified the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in
Castle in order to properly address the societal issue of support for disabled adults.249
When the General Assembly adopts a common law decision, transforming it into
state law, the legislature often adopts the underlying principles and justifications
behind the court’s rulings. However, if the wording of a statute is ambiguous, the
courts often employ the underlying common-law principles to interpret the statute. 250
Because the language of Ohio Revised Code Section 3119.86 is unclear as to
whether family law courts have jurisdiction to initiate support orders for disabled
children post-majority, Ohio courts should utilize common-law principles from
Castle.
244

Id.

245

Id. at 43.

246 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, MEMORANDUM: SPENDING FOR FEDERAL BENEFITS
AND SERVICES FOR PEOPLE WITH LOW INCOME, FY2008-FY2011: AN UPDATE OF TABLE B-1
FROM CRS REPORT R41625, MODIFIED TO REMOVE PROGRAMS FOR VETERANS 4-11 (2012).
247

Id.

248

See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3119.86 (West 2016).

249

Id.

250

Katherine Clark & Matthew Connolly, A Guide to Reading, Interpreting, and Applying
Statutes, THE WRITING CTR. (Geo. Univ. L. Ctr., D.C.), Apr. 2006, at 2,
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academic-programs/legal-writingscholarship/writing-center/upload/statutoryinterpretation.pdf.
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Per an analysis of the Ohio courts’ stances on the issue of support initiation for
disabled adults, only the Sixth, Seventh, Eleventh, and Twelfth District Courts of
Appeals accurately reflect the principles underlying Castle.251 The interpretations
cast by these four districts should prevail, and Section 3119.86 should be interpreted
to allow domestic relations courts to have jurisdiction over support matters initiated
after the disabled child reaches the age of majority.
1. Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Appellate Districts’ View: Disabled Adult Never
“Reaches Age of Majority”
In analyzing the issue of whether domestic relations courts could exercise
jurisdiction over support cases initiated after the disabled child has reached the age
of majority, the Sixth District Court of Appeals in Wiczynski allowed for the support
of a disabled child in adulthood, despite no support order being in place prior to the
child turning eighteen.252
In reaching its conclusion, the Wiczynski court relied heavily on the legal
principles and justifications in the Castle decision.253 Although the decision in Castle
did not directly address the present question before the Sixth District Court of
Appeals, the court reasoned that the analysis and ultimate holding in Castle provides
instruction on how the court should resolve the issue in the present case. 254 In
particular, the Wiczynski court was guided by Castle’s interpretation that disabled
adults are exempt from the strict “age of majority” limitation on support orders.255
The Wiczynski court even saw this interpretation reiterated in Section 3109.01 of the
Ohio Revised Code.256 Using these foregoing interpretations as a guide, the court
ultimately determined that the disabled child, who was unable to support himself had
never reached the “age of majority,” was still a minor in the law’s eyes because of
his mental condition.257 Because the disabled adult had never reached the “age of
majority” as interpreted under Castle and Section 3109.01, the Wiczynski court held
that it could retain jurisdiction to issue support for the disabled adult. 258
The Seventh District Court of Appeals in Abbas took a similar approach in
resolving the issue of whether the domestic relations court exercises jurisdiction over
251 See Donohoo v. Donohoo, 2012-Ohio-4105 (12th Dist.); In re Edgell, 2010-Ohio-6435
(11th Dist.); Wiczynski v. Wiczynski, 2006-Ohio-867, at *23 (6th Dist.); Abbas v. Abbas, 715
N.E.2d 613, 615-16 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
252

See Wiczynski, 2006-Ohio-867, at *23.

253

Id. at *15-21.

254

Id. at *17.

255

Id. at *16.

[T]he domestic relations court retains jurisdiction over parties in a divorce, dissolution
or separation proceeding to continue or to modify support payments for a mentally or
physically disabled child who was so disabled before he or she attained the statutory
age of majority, as if the child were still an infant.
Id. (quoting Castle v. Castle, 473 N.E.2d 803, 804 (Ohio 1984) (emphasis in original).
256

Id. at *21.

257

Id. at *23.

258

Id.
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support cases initiated for disabled adults. In relying on legal principles from Castle,
the Abbas court determined that, although the trial court did not initially order child
support payments, it was able to do so later because of its retention of jurisdiction
over the parties.259 The Abbas court reasoned that pursuant to Castle, it retained
jurisdiction over the support order of the disabled adult because, by granting to the
mother custody of the twenty-five year old, the court was asserting that James had
not reached the age of majority.260 Therefore, the Abbas court maintained continuing
jurisdiction over all parties.261
The Eleventh District Court of Appeals in In re Edgell also adopted the “lack of
age of majority” view shared by the Sixth and Seventh districts in addressing
jurisdictional issues when the marriage terminates after the mentally or physically
disabled child has reached the age of majority.262 Also relying on legal principles
codified from Castle, the Eleventh District determined that the court had power to
exercise jurisdiction over the support of the disabled adult.263
2. Alternative Eleventh District’s View: Castle Requires Parental “Duty of Support”
to Continue, Not the Continuance of a Pre-Existing Support Order
The Eleventh District Court of Appeals in In re Palcisco took a slightly different
approach (while still adhering to principles in Castle) in resolving the issue of
whether the domestic relations court has jurisdiction to initiate a support order for a
disabled child who has already reached the age of majority at the time of the parents’
divorce.264 In reaching its conclusion that jurisdiction existed, the court reasoned that
the statute addressing this matter merely codified the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision
that the moral and legal obligation to support disabled children does not stop simply
because the disabled child turns eighteen, unlike traditional support orders regarding
children with no disabilities.265
The court, therefore, reasoned that the text of Section 3119.86(A) does not
support the contention that a support order must be in existence to continue beyond
the child’s eighteenth birthday.266 Rather, the statute states that it is the duty of
support, not the support order itself, that shall continue where the child is mentally or
physically disabled, and this specific language came directly from Castle.267 This
duty to support exists irrespective of a child support order under Castle. Thus, the
Eleventh District found, “[T]he lack of a support order poses no impediment to the
continuation of [non-custodial parent’s] duty to support, which is conditioned upon
the child’s disability.”268
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3. Twelfth District’s View: Absurd Result of Two Distinct Classes of Disabled
Adults
The Twelfth District Court of Appeals in Donohoo also found that jurisdiction
existed for domestic relation courts to initiate child support orders for disabled
adults.269 The Donohoo court provided that “we do not read anything in R.C.
3119.86 that prohibits a domestic relations court from ordering child support for
disabled children after the child turns 18.”270 The Donohoo court further noted,
“When the Legislature codified the Ohio Supreme Court’s Castle decision, we
believe that the Legislature was codifying Ohio’s common law principle that the
obligation to support a disabled child remains even after that child has turned 18.” 271
However, the Donohoo court took another view on the issue of jurisdiction over
support orders for disabled adults initiated post-majority. The Twelfth district
reasoned that section 3119.86 should not be interpreted “in such a way as to create
two distinct classes of disabled children, those who did not turn 18 before their
parents’ divorce and therefore are entitled to support, and those who just happened to
turn 18 after the divorce and therefore are not entitled to support.” 272 The Donohoo
court further provided, “Hinging a disabled person’s entitlement to support,
regardless of the need, upon the timing of the divorce makes no sense.” 273 If this
were the case, it may give parents motivation in bad faith to postpone divorce
proceeding until after their disabled child reaches the age of majority in order to
evade support obligations. One cannot fathom that principles behind the Castle
would intend such an absurd result.
4. Tenth District’s View: Odd Ball Case-Strict Textual View Inconsistent with
Castle Principles
The Tenth District Court of Appeals in Geygan came to an opposite conclusion
of the aforementioned districts and ruled that domestic relations courts lack
jurisdiction to initiate support orders after a disabled child has reached the age of
majority.274 The Geygan court reasoned that had the Ohio legislature intended to
permit the domestic relations court to impose child support orders during a divorce
proceeding after the disabled child has already reached eighteen years old, it would
have expressly stated so.275 The court emphasized that the statute provides that the
“duty of support to a child imposed pursuant to a court child support order shall
continue beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday.”276 The court continued, “In
enacting R.C. 3119.86, the General Assembly considered the question of child
support for adult children with disabilities.”277 Further, the court explained that “[i]n
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so doing, legislators chose to incorporate the words ‘continue’ and ‘beyond’” which
could have “very easily been deleted” by the General Assembly “and stated simply
that child support may be imposed for a child who is over the age of 18 and is
mentally or physically disabled and incapable of supporting or maintaining himself
or herself.”278 Based on those reasons alone, the Geygan court concluded “that the
domestic relations court lacked jurisdiction to enter a child support order relating to
[the disabled child who was over the age of majority] at the time of the final
judgment entry.”279
The Tenth Sistrict’s strict textual view, however, deviates from principles and
justifications in Castle, so Geygan should not be followed. Castle clearly identified
that the overall duty of support for disabled children incapable of self-support
continues beyond the age of majority.280 Nothing in the Castle decision suggests that
there is a limitation requiring a support order for a disabled child to be in place prior
to the child reaching eighteen. In fact, the only limitation imposed by the Ohio
Supreme Court in Castle is that the underlying disabling condition must have existed
prior to the child reaching the age of majority. 281 As the Sixth, Seventh, Eleventh and
Twelfth districts have reiterated, the statute that Geygan has wrongly interpreted
codifies the legal decision in Castle; therefore, courts must follow rationales and
principles set forth within the Supreme Court’s decision.
D. Brief Overview of Other States’ Stances on Jurisdiction to Initiate Support For
Disabled Adults
The subsequent cases and laws from other jurisdictions allow for the initiation of
support for a disabled adult after that child has reached the age of majority:
•

In California, legislation relies on the common law principle that parents
have a compelling moral duty to care for their adult disabled children.
The California statue relating to this matter requires that “parents have a
duty to maintain . . . a child of whatever age who is incapacitated from
earning a living and without sufficient means.” 282

•

Legislation in South Carolina allows courts to initiate the support of
disabled adult children on the justification that it is in the best interest of
the child and is beneficial to the family. 283

•

Tennessee and South Dakota both follow a humanitarian belief that
parents should support their adult disabled children because the need for
support exists, and humanity requires parents to support their children
before majority should also continue post-majority.284 Specifically,
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“Both [states] provide that parents owe a duty of support to their adult
disabled children because these children are as helpless as infants.”285
•

Oregon law provides, “Parents are bound to maintain their children who
are poor and unable to work to maintain themselves. Nature imposes a
duty of child support for adult disabled children.”286

•

In Kentucky, child support for an adult handicapped child is governed
by statute, which provides that both parents “shall have joint custody,
care, and support of their children who have reached the age of eighteen
(18) and who are wholly dependent because of permanent physical or
mental disability.”287 This statute holds both parents responsible for a
child who is wholly dependent when he becomes eighteen. 288
Jurisdiction over child support cases in Kentucky further notes that
concurrent jurisdiction rests with the district and circuit courts to
establish, modify, and enforce obligations of child support in situations
where paternity is not a concern.289

•

In New Jersey, in support of the initiation of support for disabled adults,
courts provided that common sense and normal instincts of humanity
called for an obligation of support of their disabled adult children. 290

E. New View: Proposed Amendment to R.C. § 3119.86 as a Resolution to the Divide
in Interpretation of Initiation of Support for Disabled Adults
In order to properly address this split amongst Ohio courts, there needs to be a
change that comes directly from the legislature. The Ohio legislature should amend
Ohio Revised Code Section 3119.86 to provide that the obligation of support for
disabled adults shall continue beyond the age of majority regardless of whether or
not the support order was implemented prior to the disabled child reaching the age of
majority. Such an amendment will help eliminate the absurd and unintended result of
punishing disabled, dependent adults whose parents decided to wait to divorce until
after the child reached the age of majority. Below is the proposed amendment to
current legislation:
Ohio Revised Code § 3119.86: Continuance of Support Obligation beyond a
Child’s Eighteenth Birthday.
(A) Notwithstanding section 3109.01 of the Revised Code, both of the following
apply:
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(1) The father and mother shall provide support of their children who
have reached the age of eighteen (18) if any of the following apply:
(a) The child is wholly dependent because of a permanent
mental or physical disability and thus is incapable of
supporting or maintaining himself or herself.
(b) The child’s parents have agreed to continue support
beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday pursuant to a
separation agreement that was incorporated into a decree
of divorce or dissolution.
(c) The child continuously attends a recognized and
accredited high school on a full-time basis on and after the
child’s eighteenth birthday.
(B) Concurrent jurisdiction rests with the domestic relations courts to establish,
modify, and enforce obligations of child support if section 3119.86
(A)(1)(a), section 3119.86(A)(1)(b), or section 3119.86(A)(1)(c) is satisfied.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current reality is that if Section 3119.86 of the Ohio Revised Code is not
amended, Ohio divorce courts will have the unfettered discretion to circumvent
jurisdiction to initiate support orders for disabled adults, based solely on the timing
of their caregivers’ divorce. Without any attempt to rectify this ambiguity in the law,
single caregivers bear a substantial part in the financial responsibility their disabled
adult child while the noncustodial parents are relinquished of their legal obligations.
Because of the inevitable overlap between law and morality in American law,
especially in the area of family law, Section 3119.86 of the Ohio Revised Code
should be interpreted to reflect the overlap between a parent’s moral and legal duties
and recognize the courts’ powers to initiate support orders for disabled adults. It is
evident that optimized results occur when the legislature supplements moral
obligations with legislation. Further, it is even more apparent that the moral duty to
support disabled children throughout adulthood triggered legislative action in the
first place. In order to prevent disabled children from being denied continued support
by a noncustodial parent in a divorce solely because the divorce occurred once the
disabled child reached adulthood, this Ohio law must be amended to expressly
mandate that courts have the authority to initiate support orders for disabled adult
children, regardless of the timing of their caregivers’ divorce.
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